BOOK REVIEW: The Utility of Force by General Rupert Smith

The Utility of Force draws on British General Sir Rupert Smith's extensive personal experience to illuminate modern conflict in the age of international coalitions, humanitarian interventions, and asymmetrical warfare. Citing examples from the current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as the recent forays into the Balkans, Smith rejects the notion of war as an series of exercises independent from political and current events or culture. The book is divided into three parts. First, the rise of “interstate industrial war” introduced by Napoleon, described by Clausewitz, and culminating in the World Wars. Second, the Cold War, which Smith calls the “antithesis” of the previous generation of wars. Third, Smith describes “War Amongst the People” and the new understanding that modern operations require a more complete look at the human battlefield. Smith concludes with his vision for the way ahead – a future fighting force equipped with better analysis and planning for the human dimension, one that understands that the enemy is no longer a monolithic army of a foreign state.

Educated at Haileybury, the Imperial Service College, and at Sandhurst, General Sir Rupert Smith commanded the British Armored Division during the Gulf war and the United Nations Protection Force in Bosnia in 1995. Smith was also the senior European officer in NATO during the 1999 Kosovo campaign before retiring in 2002. NATO Review called Smith “one of the most outstanding officers of his generation.” Unmentioned on the dust jacket or anywhere in the text is Guardian journalist and UN political analyst Ilana Bet-El. It is unclear what role Bet-El played in drafting this book, however Smith has acknowledge Bet-El in interviews and she does share the copyright. Bet-El writes a regular column on foreign affairs and defense policy, occasionally criticized as being “too soft” on the United States out of career self-interest.

Published only three years following his retirement, The Utility of Force occasionally betrays Smith's desire to explain his decision-making. He engages in some “if only” talk, which is not entirely useless. The first part of the book is an academic review of the theories of war that precede Smith, illustrating quite nicely his radical break from tradition.

Smith advocates for a fighting force that engages with minds before machines, that anticipates the challenges of the modern world, and that understands that war is dead – only operations have survived. Smith also suggests a military that include the media, or at least the perceived reaction of the media, in every operation. He clearly understands the vital role the media play in framing events, and the importance of capitalizing on that ability:

...the media [is] to a large extent the source of the context in which the acts in the [military] theatre are played out: they do not make the facts, but it is they who express and display them...that is why establishing the context of the event and getting the story correct from the start is so important. To act effectively one is trying to gain a position where the majority of the audience and people on the stage are following your script in the context, and not that of the opponent.

Smith's understanding of the new media and how it has shaped public opinion reveals a thoughtful approach to the world that the warrior must fight in. Instead of reacting to coverage by the media, Smith exhorts commanders to anticipate and shape what the media see – actively using the media as an arm of the fighting force. This unity of media and war can only be shouldered by a commander who knows that guns and bullets are not everything.

The Utility of Force is useful in two contexts. First, for the student of warfare, it is a crisp look at the past 250 years combined with the personal reflections of a senior commander during the Gulf War and operations in Bosnia and Kosovo. Second, the book challenges the military theorist with its provocative assertion that “modern”, meaning industrial, state-on-state warfare is dead, and that militaries must adapt not only to new technology but to a human battlefield and an ever-changing media.

This does not mean that Smith is necessarily correct. He is a prophet of a coming age, but if this new warfare that Smith envisions fails to materialize – if states return to industrial warfare – then his book will be regarded by futures scholars as a curious misstep in judgment, but useful for its personal reflections nonetheless. All in all, an interesting and thoughtful book grounded in sound academic research.

References:

Cooper, Robert “Review: The Utility of Force by General Sir Rupert Smith” Sunday Times 18 September 2005

“General Rupert Smith DESACEUR” NATO Review Vol. 49, No. 2, Summer 2001

“General Sir Rupert Smith” Royal Society for the encouragement of Arts, Manufactures & Commerce (RSA) Speaker Biography 16 May 2007

Bet-El, Ilana “Who needs Fox News when you've got John Bolton?” Guardian 8 June 2006