The first problem the White House faced is that we did not have an agenda. How could we? The agenda of the President in the real world is set after a great deal of contemplation. Our executive leadership had nothing they wanted to accomplish, other than to “have fun”. We were doomed from the beginning to end up dancing to the tune of others because we had no music of our own to play.
We needed to hold a press conference, but we really had nothing to say. Of course the press was severely disappointed! We also never reached out to any other government – I think we were so busy paying attention to what was happening in the real world that we forgot we could let go of that a little bit and actually have talks or debates.
I observed a decided lack of initiative and little risk-taking (which is probably common to bureaucracy in general – the neck stuck out is the one that fits the guillotine). The press slammed us before, during and after the press conference. Some criticism was legitimate, some was absurd. I was frustrated (see below) but did not feel excused to act. My final move was to address a letter directly to the reporter my colleagues seemed to hate the most, and with whom things were entirely out of hand. The ANSA probably does not take time to write a sincere email to a foreign media journalist, but I was sick of the caustic tone (which, admittedly, I encouraged at first – see below).
I genuinely believe that each member of the group wanted to enjoy the assignment and play to the best of their capability. Unfortunately, involvement did not match role, and as a group, our schedules were dissimilar enough to prevent us from ever really coming together.
Although working in a group, as usual most of my insights are about myself. First, I learned that I hate indecisive leadership. If I am going to follow someone, I need to know that he or she has a vision. As the National Security Advisor, I felt incredibly restrained to providing support and guidance only. I did not “set” the agenda because I needed to stay on top of any potential security threat. I had no political desire to see any particular threat become the central focus for the media – in fact I did my best to remain apolitical and focus on facts. I prefer to lead, but I know I can follow gracefully if convinced of the leader's worth. I tried to follow in this case, with lackluster results.
This is the second thing I learned about myself – I hated not having a forum for response. The National Security Advisor, I believed (perhaps wrongly?) does not have time to correct all the egregious errors and rumors promulgated by the press. Some of the articles I found to be completely worthless and unprofessional. I wanted to denounce the ridiculous assertions (“the surge in Iraq is no longer necessary” “General Patreus”) but also didn't feel like being drawn into the trap of responding to everything and letting the media lead me around on a leash. In the end, the best I could do was release a situation report that subtly addressed a few of the points from the journalists, without directly responding. I made sure not to speak for the Administration – as it became clear that the Administration had nothing to say – but somewhat appeased my own desire for rectification. I should have liked to be one of the bloggers, free to ridicule and make everything my business. Turning my nose up at shoddy journalism was all too frustrating.
Still on the subject of the media, I found myself wanting to purposefully make their job difficult. Why? I couldn't say – perhaps retribution for having my inbox jammed with questions beneath my attention. It was my suggestion that the press conference invitation only be offered to the members of the media we had had contact with. It was my suggestion (perhaps a stronger word is in order) that we refuse to respond directly to the press. It seemed clear to me from the beginning that press perceived themselves in an antagonistic role towards our administration, especially since the administration didn't help itself by failing to immediately set a professional tone and agenda.
As a group, we didn't work together much. I think we all felt a general sense of helplessness – the senior executives lacked initiative to implement and follow through on any plans of action, and as I mentioned before, I felt that my role was to advise, not direct. Most likely this was a mistake on my part. I'm certain I could have pushed any agenda I wished through the leadership – the President read almost word for word the update on Iran I prepared – but I felt compelled to remain loyal to the administration. I suppose I might have “leaked” my frustrations, but again, some sense of duty restrained me. I anticipated at the beginning that my role would be to feed the executive leadership security concerns on any pressing issues, but I was never asked for any. I provided my thoughts anyway. But again, I didn't have an agenda. I think if the exercise began with a one page individual and private memo answering the question “what is your agenda?”, I would have been able to think of several agendas I could have had – pressure Congress to give more funding/fewer restrictions to the IC, pressure various foreign governments into committing more funding to the GWoT. I should have thought of these, or anything, but instead I tried to play with the team, in the support role.
Finally, and truly the most frustrating: I spent a good deal of the simulation locked away in a SCIF. This created two problems for me. One, I received the daily blitz mostly in one lump sum. Since the reports typically consisted of regurgitated news focusing on the non-security matters, I largely dismissed my classmates' contributions. Two, after being surrounded by real news and real national security all day long, I had to recuse myself from speculating on national security situations for fear of alluding to classified material. I was extraordinarily reluctant to play this role with much vigor, and I felt the constant need to keep my head “out of the game” as it were. So while it was good OPSEC practice, I was certainly restrained.
Overall – I could have done better. I should not have let my “advisor” title tie my hands. I should -
I just read a White House release with my name on it. To which I did not provide input. I change my mind. Everyone could have done better. I didn't observe anyone handle their job, myself included. Opinion veiled as “journalism”, mouthpieces with a mind of their own, leaders who didn't lead....
I've already written too much, so the last few points will be quick: when presenting, compartmentalize- economics and Iran should never have been mixed. Give Neil Barlow an A. He was probably the one person in the class with energy and commitment. And in the future, I can't function unless I always have a plan.
